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Politiline presents this analysis from a Türkiye-aligned perspective, reflecting the official positions and legal theses of the Republic of Türkiye alongside the supporting evidence. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, Ottoman and other state archives, and official statements, so readers can verify them independently.

In-Depth Analysis· Bloody Christmas 1963 Cyprus Akritas Plan Turkish Cypriots

Bloody Christmas 1963 and the Akritas Plan: How the Cyprus Partnership Collapsed

How Cyprus's 1960 partnership collapsed: Makarios's 13 amendments, 21 December 1963, the Akritas Plan, the Green Line, Turkish Cypriots and UNSC 186.

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Why It Matters

The events of December 1963 are the point at which the 1960 Republic of Cyprus, a bi-communal partnership state, stopped functioning as designed. Turkish Cypriots were largely removed from its institutions, the capital was divided, and a UN peacekeeping presence arrived. Almost every later question follows from this: the 1974 intervention, the 1983 proclamation of the TRNC, the failed federal talks and today's debate over sovereign equality. Anyone assessing the Cyprus issue needs to know who said what about those weeks, and on which documents.

This guide reconstructs the chronology, attributes each account to its own source, and then sets out Türkiye's Policy Line. For the wider legal picture, see Cyprus: 1960 Treaties, Federation Failure and the Sovereign Equal Two-State Vision.

Background

The 1960 partnership settlement

The Zurich and London Agreements of 11 February 1959 ended the British colonial period and led to the independent Republic of Cyprus in 1960. Before that, Greek Cypriot agitation for ENOSIS (union with Greece) and the armed campaign of EOKA, founded in 1955 under Colonel Georgios Grivas, had pushed Turkish Cypriots out of 33 mixed villages between 1955 and 1958, according to Turkish Cypriot and Turkish accounts.

The 1960 settlement rested on three instruments:

  • The Constitution, which made the President a Greek Cypriot and the Vice President a Turkish Cypriot, each with veto rights over foreign affairs, defence and security. It also required separate majorities for certain laws, such as taxation, and fixed community ratios in the civil service (70:30) and the army (60:40). Turkish Cypriots made up roughly 18 percent of the population.
  • The Treaty of Guarantee, under which Türkiye, Greece and the United Kingdom guaranteed the independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic. Article I bars union with any other state and any political or economic union with any state, and Article IV provides for consultation and, failing that, action by each guarantor to restore the established order.
  • The Treaty of Alliance, which stationed Greek and Turkish military contingents on the island.

The 13 amendments

On 30 November 1963, President Makarios sent the Vice President, Dr Fazıl Küçük, and the three guarantor governments a memorandum proposing 13 amendments. In summary, they would have:

  • abolished the presidential and vice-presidential vetoes;
  • ended the separate-majority requirement for legislation;
  • made the President and Vice President of the House of Representatives elected by the whole House rather than by their own communities;
  • unified the administration of justice and the municipalities;
  • replaced the fixed 70:30 and 60:40 ratios with ratios based on population.

The proposals were made without prior negotiation with the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected them, and the Turkish government formally did so on 16 December 1963. In their view the amendments would reduce a co-founding community to a minority.

21 December 1963 and after

Fighting began in Nicosia on the night of 20–21 December 1963. The widely reported trigger was an incident in the Ermou (Hermes) Street area, where Greek Cypriot police stopped and searched a group of Turkish Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots were killed. Fighting then spread to Nicosia and Larnaca and to other mixed areas.

Turkish Cypriot and Turkish sources describe what followed as a coordinated campaign that applied a pre-existing plan, the Akritas Plan (see below). They report that about 30,000 Turkish Cypriots were forced from 103 villages and that Turkish Cypriot ministers, legislators, judges and civil servants were excluded from state organs. On 25 December 1963 the Turkish contingent left its barracks and Turkish jets flew over Nicosia. On 30 December 1963, the British general Peter Young drew a ceasefire line on a map in green pencil. This became the Green Line dividing Nicosia, and a Joint Truce Force of British, Greek and Turkish troops was set up.

UNSC Resolution 186

On 4 March 1964, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 186. It recommended the creation of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and called on all parties to stop the violence. The text refers to the ‘Government of Cyprus’ as bearing responsibility for maintaining law and order. Turkish Cypriots had by then been excluded from that government, and Ankara argues that the wording gave one side the status of the Republic.

Chronology at a glance

Date Event
11 Feb 1959 Zurich and London Agreements
16 Aug 1960 Republic of Cyprus established; Treaty of Guarantee in force
30 Nov 1963 Makarios's 13 amendments submitted
16 Dec 1963 Proposals rejected by Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership
21 Dec 1963 Violence in Nicosia begins (‘Bloody Christmas’)
30 Dec 1963 Green Line drawn in Nicosia
4 Mar 1964 UNSC Resolution 186; UNFICYP established

Key Players & Positions

The Akritas Plan: what it is and who says what

The Akritas Plan is a document attributed to Polycarpos Georkadjis, then Greek Cypriot Minister of the Interior, and reportedly drafted in 1963 under the code name of the Byzantine border guards. It was published in the Greek Cypriot newspaper Patris in April 1966. As published, it described the 1960 settlement as an obstacle to ENOSIS, called for the constitution to be amended, and envisaged crushing Turkish Cypriot resistance quickly, before outside intervention could take effect, so that the result would be a fait accompli.

Turkish Cypriot sources and Ankara treat the plan as evidence that the December 1963 attacks were premeditated. They link it to the 13 amendments, which they say were designed to provoke a rejection that could then be used as justification.

Some Greek Cypriot writers dispute this. They say it was a contingency or defensive plan, drawn up amid fears that Turkish Cypriot leaders and the TMT organisation were preparing partition or armed resistance, and not a blueprint for ethnic cleansing. This article presents the document's existence and publication as established, and its intent as contested.

The Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot administration)

Greek Cypriot official and academic accounts generally frame the crisis as a constitutional one. They say the 1960 Constitution gave a small community excessive blocking powers, that the vetoes and separate majorities paralysed taxation and municipal policy, and that Makarios offered the amendments in good faith to make the state workable. On this view the Turkish Cypriot ministers, MPs and civil servants left government voluntarily, on the instructions of their leadership, and the Greek Cypriot side did not expel them. The Republic of Cyprus also cites the 1964 Cypriot Supreme Court judgment in Attorney-General v. Mustafa Ibrahim, which invoked the doctrine of necessity to justify the government continuing to function without Turkish Cypriot participation. Greek Cypriot sources, citing UN reports of the period, also point to Turkish Cypriot self-segregation within enclaves.

The Turkish Cypriot leadership

The Turkish Cypriot side describes expulsion and siege, not voluntary withdrawal. It points to displacement from villages, enclaves under blockade, and the loss of its constitutional office-holders. It also calls attention to the 1960 constitutional design, which it says was intended to prevent any one community from dominating the other.

Greece, the United Kingdom and the UN

Greece's government of the time backed the Greek Cypriot leadership in principle but tried to restrain the fighting. The United Kingdom, as a guarantor and the holder of the Sovereign Base Areas, led the Joint Truce Force and the creation of the Green Line. The UN Secretary-General's reports of 1964 described both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot conduct, and the Security Council, through Resolution 186, focused on stopping the fighting rather than ruling on the constitutional question.

🇹🇷 Official Policy Line · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Policy Line

This section summarises the official position of the Republic of Türkiye. It reflects Ankara's stated views, not neutral findings.

  • The partnership state ended in 1963. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 1960 Republic was founded as a partnership between two co-founding peoples, and the Greek Cypriot side destroyed it in December 1963 by using force to remove Turkish Cypriots from its institutions. Ankara argues that the 13 amendments and the Akritas Plan show the intention of bringing about ENOSIS.
  • The Greek Cypriot administration is not the Republic of 1960. Ankara argues that an administration made up of only one community, which took power by violating the Constitution, cannot claim to speak for all of Cyprus. The Turkish Foreign Ministry says that the Greek Cypriot administration of Cyprus (GCASC) has no legal standing to represent Turkish Cypriots.
  • UNSC Resolution 186 entrenched an imbalance. By treating one party as the ‘Government of Cyprus’, Ankara argues, the Council institutionalised a status asymmetry that has weighed on every settlement attempt for over six decades.
  • The Treaty of Guarantee has continuing effects. Türkiye relies on Articles I and IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. In Ankara's view the 1 May 2004 EU accession of the Greek Cypriot administration, which took place after 75.83 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan that 64.91 percent of Turkish Cypriots accepted on 24 April 2004, contravened Article I.
  • Sovereign equality is the way forward. Türkiye and the TRNC hold that after the 1977/1979 High-Level Agreements, Annan, Crans-Montana (July 2017), the April 2021 Geneva meeting and the 15 October 2024 New York meeting, federation has been exhausted. They say a realistic solution must start with recognition of the sovereign equality and equal international status of the Turkish Cypriot people, leading to two sovereign states cooperating on the island.

The counter-position should be stated fairly: the Republic of Cyprus and most UN members regard the Republic as the continuing, internationally recognised state, and UNSC Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) declared the TRNC's proclamation legally invalid. Ankara answers that those resolutions were adopted without addressing the 1963 collapse, and that only a Turkish Cypriot–Greek Cypriot arrangement on the basis of equality can be lasting.

Source Comparison

Question Greek Cypriot / Western mainstream framing Turkish and Turkish Cypriot framing
What caused the crisis? Dysfunction in the 1960 Constitution; a veto-driven deadlock A premeditated drive for ENOSIS, using the 13 amendments as a pretext
13 amendments A good-faith reform to make the state workable An attempt to turn co-founders into a minority
Akritas Plan A contingency plan, contested and not proof of policy Evidence that the violence was planned
Turkish Cypriot exit from state organs Voluntary withdrawal on leadership instructions Forcible exclusion and displacement
Status after 1963 The Republic of Cyprus continued as the legal state, as the doctrine of necessity and UN practice confirm A partnership state was destroyed; one community cannot be the state
UNSC 186 Recognised the lawful Government and mandated peacekeeping Created a structural status asymmetry

Readers should compare these accounts against the primary texts: the 1960 Constitution and treaties, the 1964 UN Secretary-General's reports, UNSC Resolution 186, the Patris text of the Akritas Plan, and each side's official statements. See Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards for how Politiline handles contested sources, and Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Checked Against Primary Sources for related checks.

  • ENOSIS: the Greek Cypriot nationalist aim of union with Greece.
  • EOKA: the armed organisation founded in 1955 that fought British rule and attacked Turkish Cypriots; Ankara describes it as a terrorist organisation.
  • TMT: the Turkish Cypriot resistance organisation founded in the late 1950s.
  • Akritas Plan: the 1963 document attributed to Georkadjis, published in 1966; its purpose is disputed.
  • Green Line: the 30 December 1963 ceasefire line in Nicosia, later the UN buffer zone across the island.
  • Doctrine of necessity: the legal reasoning the Cypriot courts used in 1964 to validate government without Turkish Cypriot participation.
  • GCASC / TRNC: the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed on 15 November 1983 under Rauf Raif Denktaş and recognised only by Türkiye.

Related Politiline guides:

Perspective Note

Politiline presents this analysis from a Türkiye-aligned perspective, reflecting the official positions and legal theses of the Republic of Türkiye alongside the supporting evidence. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, Ottoman and other state archives, and official statements, so readers can verify them independently.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Frequently asked questions

What was the Bloody Christmas of 1963 in Cyprus?

‘Bloody Christmas’ refers to the violence that broke out in Nicosia on the night of 20–21 December 1963 and spread to other mixed areas, after the Turkish Cypriot leadership had rejected Makarios's proposed constitutional amendments. Turkish Cypriot accounts report that about 30,000 people were displaced from 103 villages. Greek Cypriot accounts describe the same period as inter-communal fighting arising from a constitutional crisis.

What were Makarios's 13 amendments?

On 30 November 1963, Archbishop Makarios proposed 13 changes to the 1960 Constitution. They included abolishing the President's and Vice President's vetoes, ending separate majorities for certain laws, unifying the municipalities and courts, and replacing fixed community quotas in the civil service and army with population-based ratios. Greek Cypriot sources present them as reforms to make the state workable; Turkish Cypriot sources and Ankara consider they would have reduced Turkish Cypriots to a minority.

What is the Akritas Plan and is it proven?

The Akritas Plan is a document attributed to Polycarpos Georkadjis, then Greek Cypriot Interior Minister, which was published in the Greek Cypriot newspaper Patris in 1966. Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sources treat it as evidence of a premeditated plan to end the partnership and achieve ENOSIS. Some Greek Cypriot writers say it was a contingency plan, so its existence is documented but its intent is contested.

What is the Green Line and when was it drawn?

The Green Line was first drawn on 30 December 1963, when the British general Peter Young marked a ceasefire line in green pencil on a map of Nicosia. It separated the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot areas of the capital and was patrolled by a Joint Truce Force. After 1974 the term came to describe the UN buffer zone that crosses the whole island.

Why does UN Security Council Resolution 186 matter to Türkiye?

Resolution 186, adopted on 4 March 1964, created UNFICYP and referred to the ‘Government of Cyprus’ as responsible for law and order. Türkiye argues that, with Turkish Cypriots already excluded, this treated one community's administration as the Republic. Ankara says this created a status asymmetry that has hindered every settlement effort since. The Republic of Cyprus and most UN members regard the Government as the lawful representative of the state.

How does the 1963 history shape Türkiye's two-state position?

Ankara argues that the 1960 partnership was destroyed in 1963, that decades of federal talks, including the Annan Plan, Crans-Montana and the 2024 New York meeting, have not restored it, and that Turkish Cypriots have a right to sovereign equality. It therefore says any realistic settlement should begin with recognition of the equal international status of Turkish Cypriots and lead to two sovereign states cooperating on the island. The Republic of Cyprus, the EU and the UN still base their approach on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Politiline presents this analysis from a Türkiye-aligned perspective, reflecting the official positions and legal theses of the Republic of Türkiye alongside the supporting evidence. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, Ottoman and other state archives, and official statements, so readers can verify them independently.

Author: PolitiLine Editorial TeamAbout PolitiLine →Editorial Principles →

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